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THE COURT'S CHARGE IN A LAND SUIT t
by
Clayton L. Orn*
N THE Declaration of Independence made by the delegates of the
people of Texas at Washington on the Brazos, it was stated as one
of the grievances of the people against the Mexican Government
necessitating the dissolution of their ties that it "has failed and re-
fused to secure, on a firm basis, the right of trial by jury, that pal-
ladium of civil liberty, and only safe guarantee for the life, liberty,
and property of the citizens."' The right to a jury trial thus ad-
vanced at Washington on the Brazos was secured at San Jacinto, and
all the constitutions of the Republic and State of Texas have pre-
served that right and in the same language---"the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate."'
From the time of the inclusion of this language in the first con-
stitution down to the present, the procedural problems incident to
a jury trial, whether it be a land suit, a damage suit, or a will con-
test, have been of great importance to the legal profession and the
judiciary. Among the procedural problems in a jury trial is the
charge. Its importance is such that it has been the subject of many
books, of much discussion, a prolific source of reversals, the cause
of much perplexity, and the subject of change by statute and rule.
Civil cases in the district and county courts are submitted to a
jury on either a general charge or on special issues.3 In the earlier
days of Texas jurisprudence there were statutes which permitted the
submission of special issues, but the general charge was ordinarily
used. It was not until the Act of 1913 that the method of submit-
ting cases on special issues came into general use." That act not only
authorized the court in its discretion to submit causes on special is-
sues, but also departed from previous statutes by making it manda-
tory when requested by either party to the suit.' Under the present
Rules of Civil Procedure' district and county courts may submit
a civil cause to the jury on a general charge if the parties agree or
if neither party requests a submission upon special issues; or the
t This article was first published in Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute on Trial
of a Land Suit (1952), the supply of which is now exhausted. The Journal is pleased
to publish the article, which has been revised, for the benefit of those who were unable
to obtain a copy of the article as it was originally published.
* Member of Texas, Ohio, and District of Columbia Bars.
11 Gammel's Laws of Texas 1065 (1898).
2 Cockrill v. Cox, 65 Tex. 669, 672 (1886).
3 Tex. R. Civ. P. 277. These will hereinafter be cited by Rule number only.
'Speer, Special Issues in Texas xi (1931).
5 Id. at 14.
6 Rule 277.
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court may, for good cause, submit a case on a general charge even
when one or all parties have otherwise requested. Whether good
cause exists for not submitting the case on special issues is subject to
review by the appellate courts. If the case could be submitted on
special issues, no good cause would exist for not doing so. No case
has been found where the court refused to submit a case on special
issues after proper request had been made.
The principal object of the special issue submission is to have the
jury find the facts and the trial court render such judgment as the
law demands.' This prevents the jury from first determining which
party should have judgment and then framing its verdict to accom-
plish that end. The principal distinction between submitting a case
on a general charge and on special issues is that on a general charge
the jury determines the facts and applies to the facts the law as given
by the court, whereas on special issues the jury determines the facts
and the court applies the law to the facts as found.8
I. THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In 1939 the Legislature repealed, effective as of September 1, 1941,
all laws governing the practice and procedure in civil actions and
relinquished to the Supreme Court full rule-making power, subject
to legislative veto.' The submission of a case to a jury, whether it
be a land suit, a tort action, or a divorce action, is now governed
by Rules 271 to 279, inclusive.
The question immediately arises whether there is any difference
between submitting a land suit and any other civil action. There is
only one difference. In the ordinary civil action the defendant is not
entitled to an affirmative submission of any issue in his behalf if
such issue is raised only by a general denial and not by an affirma-
tive written pleading." In a trespass to try title suit the rule is differ-
ent, the reason being that in a trespass to try title suit the defendant
may file only a plea of not guilty and prove under the plea any law-
ful defense to the statutory action except the defense of limitations
which must be specially pleaded.1 Consequently, in a trespass to try
title suit, in submitting the defendant's defenses there are no de-
fensive pleadings which the court can follow in determining the de-
"Amarillo v. Huddleston, 133 Tex. 226, 152 S.W.2d 1088 (1941).
'Colorado & S. Ry. Co. v. Rowe, 238 S.W. 908 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1731a (1945). Statutes will hereinafter be referred





fensive issues to be submitted. The issues to be submitted must be
ascertained from the evidence.
A. Controlling Issues
Only the controlling issues made by the written pleadings and
the evidence are to be submitted in a land suit. When they have
been fairly submitted the case will not be reversed because of the
failure of the court to submit other and various phases or different
shades of the same issue.'" The rules of civil procedure do not define
what are controlling issues. The late Chief Justice Alexander said
that the term was practically incapable of definition and was used
because of the lack of a better one.'3 A controlling issue is different
from an evidentiary issue, but the distinction between a controlling
issue and an evidentiary issue is so imperceptible and so few opinions
have been written in land suits making a distinction that the land
lawyer must look to the opinions of the courts in other types of ac-
tions, particularly tort actions, where the trail has been blazed by the
damage suit lawyer.
An approach to the question may be made by comparing a con-
trolling issue with an independent ground of recovery or of defense.
Rule 279 provides that where an independent ground of recovery
or defense consists of more than one issue, but some of the issues
are submitted to the jury and others are omitted, the court may
make findings on the omitted issue in support of the judgment. It
may be said then that a controlling issue consists of one or more
material propositions of fact, which, to follow the language in the
Pepper case" "constitutes a component element of a ground of re-
covery or of defense."
It has been said" that the object, purpose, and meaning of the rule
with reference to a controlling issue could be more easily illustrated
than defined. To illustrate the rule as applied to a land suit, assume
that plaintiff has the record title to a section of land, and that de-
fendant affirmatively pleads as an independent ground of defense
the five-year statute of limitations. The material issues of fact on
the defensive plea are (1) peaceable possession, (2) adverse posses-
sion, (3) cultivation, use or enjoyment, (4) payment of taxes, (5)
claim under a deed duly registered, and (6) continuance of these
acts for five consecutive years. The controlling issue to be submitted
to the jury is whether the defendant has held peaceable and adverse
12 Rule 279.
"
3 Shafer, Gammel's Annotated Rules of Civil Procedure 1-18 (1948).
'Wichita Falls & S. Ry. Co. v. Pepper, 134 Tex. 360, 135 S.W.2d 79 (1940).
"5 Shafer, op. cit. supra note 13, at li.
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possession of the land, cultivating, using or enjoying the same and
paying taxes thereon, and claiming under a deed duly registered for
any period of five consecutive years. While it is true that the con-
trolling issue consists of six evidentiary issues, nevertheless only the
controlling issue should be submitted." If any of the evidentiary is-
sues should be omitted without objection in submitting the control-
ling issue, under Rule 279 the court may make written findings on
the omitted issue in support of the judgment.
Safe advice to both counsel and the judiciary is contained in the
following statement made by Judge Alexander:
Ordinarily, if the trial judge will examine his case carefully before
beginning the preparation of his charge, he will be able to reduce the
case to a very few controlling issues. Under the above rule, when he
fairly submits the controlling issues, the case will not be reversed be-
cause of his failure to "pulverize" the issues."
Each controlling issue need be submitted only once, but it must be
submitted fairly, simply, and succinctly. No party is entitled to have
the identical controlling issue submitted to the jury in two or more
different forms.'"
Rule 279 provides that when the court has fairly submitted the
controlling issue, the case will not be reversed because of failure to
submit other and various phases or different shades of the same is-
sue. There is no guide for determining when a special issue ceases to
be a different shade of an issue already submittd and becomes an-
other controlling issue. In LeBeau v. Highway Insurance Underwrit-
ers, a workman's compensation case, the Court held that an issue
inquiring whether the employee's death was not the result of na-
tural causes was merely a different shade of another issue inquiring
whether the employee's death was caused by an accident.
B. Explanatory Instructions and Definitions
Rule 277 provides that the charge must include such explanatory
instructions and such definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary
to enable the jury properly to pass upon and render a verdict on
such issues, and in such instances the charge shall not be subject to
the objection that it is a general charge. Article 2189, from which
the rule was taken, directed the inclusion of necessary "explanations
and definitions of legal terms." Rule 277 is a radical departure from
'"Whitten v. Dethloff, 214 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
17 Shafer, op. cit. supra note 15.
"SSchumacher v. Holcomb, 142 Tex. 332, 177 S.W.2d 951 (1,944); Northeast Tex.
Motor Lines v. Hodges, 138 Tex. 280, 158 S.W.2d 487 (1942).
'9143 Tex. 589, 187 S.W.2d 73 (1945).
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article 2189 insofar as it authorizes the court to submit explana-
tory instructions. Judge Alexander, in speaking of this departure,
said:
Heretofore the court has been limited under the present statute in
its submission of the case to the jury on special issues, to the submission
of questions and the definitions of legal terms. It was held to be im-
proper for the court ever to attempt to apply the law to the facts. The
judge had to confine himself to mere definitions and explanations of
legal terms .... Under the amendment above quoted, it will not be re-
versible error for the court to instruct the jury on any phase of the
law, where such instructions are otherwise correct and are necessary to
enable the jury to answer properly the issues submitted to them."0
The changes brought about by Rule 277 are quite apparent when
the cases of Guthrie v. Texas Pacific Coal FJ Oil Company,"' decided
under article 2189, and Pearson v. Doherty," decided under Rule
277, are compared. In the Guthrie case, the following issue was sub-
mitted:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case, that
the property involved in this suit was the business homestead of the
defendant W. B. Guthrie, on July 1, 1929?23
In connection with this issue the court charged the jury as follows:
To aid you in answering the above and foregoing special issue, you
are instructed that, if at the time mentioned, the defendant W. B.
Guthrie, was using said property as a place to exercise the calling or
business of the head of the family, then the same would be a business
homestead, as that term is used in this charge.
If the renting of said property by the defendant to a tenant or ten-
ants shown in the testimony was temporary in its character, that is, if
it was the intention of defendant, at all times to rent the same for a
while, but thereafter, again to occupy and use the same for the purposes
of a business homestead, then such temporary renting would not de-
stroy the character of the property as a business homestead.
On the other hand, if at the time said property was rented, or at any
time after said proprty was rented, to a tenant or tenants by the de-
fendant, he had the intentions never again to occupy or use the same
for the purposes of a business homestead then such property would not
be a business homestead, as that term is used in this charge. 4
The Court condemned the instruction as a general charge.
In the Pearson case the Court suggested that in connection with
20Shafer, op. cit. supra note 13, at xlix.
22132 Tex. 180, 122 S.W.2d 1049 (1939).
22 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453 (1944).
2 132 Tex. 180, 182, 122 S.W.2d 1049, 1050-51 (1939).
24 1d. at 183, 122 S.W.2d at 1051.
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Special Issue No. 3 submitting the ten-year statute of limitation, the
following instruction should be given:
m . . in order for Pearson and wife to have had peaceable and ad-
verse possession of the land in question within the meaning of the law,
they must have held possession of the land for the full ten-year period
adversely and in hostility to the claim of Doherty, and unless the jury
finds from a preponderance of the evidence that they have so held such
land adversely and in hostility to the claim of Doherty, they will an-
swer Issue No. 3 in the negative. 5
While Rule 277 affords a greater latitude to the trial judge than
did article 2189, and instructions are now permissible which for-
merly would have been condemned, the rule does not authorize the
giving of an instruction which is not "necessary to enable the jury
to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issues" if such
instruction will prejudice one of the parties before the jury." In the
Boaz case the court quoted with approval the following from an
article by Judge J. D. Dooley: "'This clause will permit explana-
tory instructions, even in the nature of general charges, whenever
there is good need for same to properly aid the jury. In my opinion,
however, this does not license an unlimited use of general charges
in a special issue case.' ,,27
Under article 2189 it was, and under Rule 277 it is now, the duty
of the trial court upon proper request to define terms that have such
a distinct legal meaning that they must be understood by the jury
before a verdict can be rendered upon the issues submitted. 2' How-
ever, Rule 279 provides that "failure to submit a definition ... shall
not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment unless a sub-
stantially correct definition . . . has been requested in writing and
tendered by the party complaining of the judgment. '2
Legal terms used in land suits which should be defined are volumi-
nous but the following are some: "peaceable possession" and "ad-
verse possession"; 0 "community property" and "separate proper-
ty";" "misrepresentation" and "fraud";" "in paying quantities" and
2 5143 Tex. 64, 71, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1944).
2
6 Boaz v. White's Auto Stores, 141 Tex. 366, 172 S.W.2d 481 (1943).
2Id. at 484.
2"Robertson & Mueller v. Holden, 1 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Texas
Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.9 Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Green, 154 Tex. 330, 277 S.W.2d 92 (1955).
"°Shellhammer v. Caruthers, 149 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
"Hutson v. Bassett, 35 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
3"Wortman v. Young, 221 S.W. 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), rev'd on other grounds,
235 S.W. 559 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
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"due diligence"; 3 "material inducement";" and "market value.""
However, legal terms should be explained or defined only when they
have a special technical meaning and are used in law or in a judicial
proceeding differently from their ordinary use, or when it is neces-
sary for the jury to understand their legal meaning in order to pass
on the issues submitted."'
C. Controverted Questions
Rule 272 provides that the court shall submit only controverted
questions of fact. It should refuse to submit any issue unless the
facts relevant to the issue are in dispute. "Admitted facts should
not be submitted and thereby possibly confused with the other
issues.""
There are many lawsuits which in one way or another involve the
title to lands. There are suits to cancel deeds and other instruments
for fraud or duress, to reform deeds, to construe deeds, to remove
cloud, to quiet title, to locate boundaries, to probate and construe
wills-but the most common of all is the statutory action of trespass
to try title.
Many land suits involve no issues of fact, but only issues of law,
and are frequently tried before the court without a jury. Generally,
where a jury has been demanded either the plaintiff or the defendant
is relying upon a limitation title.
II. TITLE BY LIMITATION
In most civil actions the limitation statutes are only defensive
weapons, but in a land suit they are a double-edged sword. Under
the provisions of article 5513, when an action for the recovery of
land is barred by any of the statutes the person having peaceable
and adverse possession is deemed to have full title precluding all
claims. Consequently, the plaintiff may defeat the defendant's record
title by proving a title in him under one of the limitation statutes.
The land lawyer, therefore, must know how the issues of limitation
should be submitted to the jury.
A. Peaceable and Adverse Possession
The adverse claimant to mature a title under the three-,"8 five-, 9
'
3 Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.
" Porter v. Robinson, 93 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
"'Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Watkins, 26 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
3Texas & N.O. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 32 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.3 Lamar v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry. Co., 248 S.W. 34 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
" Art. 5507.9 Art. 5509.
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ten-, 0 and twenty-five-_ year statutes of limitation must have had
"peaceable and adverse possession" of the land for the statutory per-
iod. "Peaceable possession" is defined in article 5514 as being such
possession as is continuous and not interrupted by adverse suit to
recover the estate. "Adverse possession" is defined in article 551'5 as
being such possession as is an actual and visible appropriation of the
land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent
with and hostile to the claim of another.
Unless the evidence shows that the adverse claimant has been in
peaceable and adverse possession of the land, no issue under the
three-, five-, or ten-year statutes should be submitted. Actual pos-
session of a part of the land is absolutely necessary."' The possession
may be by an actual residence on the land, by such cultivation, use
or enjoyment, or by visible, notorious acts of ownership as would
give notice to the owner of the adverse claim.4 It may be by the
adverse claimant or by a tenant." In determining whether an issue
should be submitted under one of the statutes of limitation it is
necessary to understand what constitutes peaceable and adverse pos-
session. Possession standing alone is not sufficient to mature a title
under the five- and ten-year statutes. There must also be cultivation,
use or enjoyment of the land. It must be used for some purpose for
which it is adapted."
As a general rule, the land need not be separately inclosed if the
adverse claimant is in possession under a deed or other written evi-
dence of title, unless the land is used for grazing or unless the claim-
ant is relying upon the ten-year statute, and the land is surrounded
by other lands owned or claimed by him or adjoins 5,000 acres or
more of land owned or claimed by him. An adverse claimant in pos-
session of land under a deed, cultivating, using or enjoying the
same, is in constructive possession of all of the land comprehended
within the boundaries of his deed, though not in actual possession of
the entire tract," except where the possession is limited by the rule
laid down in Turner v. Moore.'
Pasturing of stock is a use of land which will mature in the ad-
verse claimant a limitation title, but the lands must be inclosed by
4 0 Art. 5510.
4"Art. 5519.
42McDow v. Rabb, 56 Tex. 154 (1882).
"'Carlock v. Willard, 149 S.W. 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
"Dawson v. Ward, 71 Tex. 72, 9 S.W. 106 (1888).
"
2 Nona Mills Co. v. Wright, 101 Tex. 14, 102 S.W. 1118 (1907).
46Caver v. Liverman, 143 Tex. 359, 185 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error
dism., judg. cor.
4781 Tex. 206, 16 S.W. 929 (1891).
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fences, or fences and natural barriers, and the fences must be main-
tained."' The possession must also be hostile to the claim of the true
owner. ' Recognition of the title of the owner prevents or arrests
the running of the statute. If the record owner interposes as a de-
fense under a plea of not guilty the recognition of his title by the
adverse claimant during the limitation period, it has been held that
he is entitled to have the issue of recognition submitted to the jury.
In Cuniff v. Bernard Corporation" the court submitted the follow-
ing issue on recognition:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 0. T. Cu-
niff at any time within the said period of ten years therein found by
you admitted, acknowledged or recognized by his words, acts or deeds
that R. S. Sterling, R. S. Sterling Investment Company or Sour Lake
State Bank was the owner of the land referred to therein?"51
The jury found that the adverse claimant had recognized the
title of the record owner during the ten-year period, although in
response to the previous issue, it had found that the record owner
had held peaceable and adverse possession of the land for this period.
The district court entered a judgment against the adverse claimant.
On appeal he contended that the issue concerning recognition of title
was evidentiary and that the ultimate issue of whether he had held
peaceable and adverse possession for a ten-year period was answered
favorably to his contention, entitling him to a judgment. The con-
tention was overruled. The court said:
Thus, recognition of the defendant's title was an ultimate and con-
trolling issue which, when found to exist, completely destroyed the
plaintiff's claim to title by limitation. Being an ultimate and control-
ling issue, it was proper for the court to submit it ....
Nor do we think that the special findings concerning recognition of
title were in conflict with the general issues of adverse possession and
limitation found in plaintiff's favor so as to require the trial court to
enter a mistrial. The special findings were not necessarily inconsistent
with the general findings. The plaintiff Cuniff may have had the inT
tent to claim the land adversely, as he testified he did. But, no matter
what his intent may have been, his recognition of the defendant's title,
as a matter of law, destroyed the adverse character of it ....
But, even if the special findings be treated as contradictory of the
general issues submitting the 10-year statute of limitation, still the spe-
cial findings of recognition must be given controlling effect. In such
"'Wallis v. Long, 75 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.; Patrucio v. Sel-
kirk, 160 S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref.4 Ford v. McRae, 128 Tex. 106, 96 S.W.2d 80 (1936).
"092 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref.
5 Id. at 578.
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case the general finding is treated as a mere legal conclusion, the effect
of which is destroyed by the adverse finding of a controlling fact upon
which such conclusion rests."
The identical point under similar facts and findings arose again in
Bennett v. Carey," and the case was disposed of in the same way.
The special issues submitted to the jury may be found in the opinion.
In each of these cases the court held that the issues were not con-
flicting and that the record owner was entitled to judgment. The
cases were decided before Rule 279 was adopted, which provides that
where the court has fairly submitted the controlling issues, the case
will not be reversed because of the failure to submit other or various
phases or different shades of the same issue.
The ultimate issue under the three-, five-, and ten-year statutes is
whether the adverse claimant has been in peaceable and adverse pos-
session. The term "adverse possession" is defined by statute as an ac-
tual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and contin-
ued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim
of another. A finding that the claimant had been in possession under
a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another
was tantamount to a finding that the claimant had not during the
period recognized the claim of the true owner. Consequently the is-
sue of recognition should not have been submitted in the Cuniff
and Bennett cases.
The opinions in the Cuniff and Bennett cases were criticized by
the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Doherty." Judge Critz said the
jury findings were in conflict and that the decision of the Court of
Civil Appeals holding they were not, was contrary to the other
decisions of the Supreme Court.
In Pearson v. Doherty the trial court submitted an issue inquiring
whether the adverse claimant had held peaceable, adverse, and con-
tinuous possession of the land, using or enjoying the same for a per-
iod of ten years. It also submitted another issue as to whether the
adverse claimant was holding the land adversely and in hostility to
the true owner. The jury found in favor of the adverse claimant on
the first issue and against him on the second issue. The Supreme
Court held that the findings were in conflict and that no judgment
should have been entered on the verdict. It said that on another
trial it would not be error for the court to submit the issues as they
had been submitted on the first trial, but it should refuse to receive
5Id. at 580.
"99 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism.
54143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453 (1944).
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the verdict if the answers were conflicting. It also said that the trial
court might have avoided the necessity of submitting an issue as to
whether the adverse claimant had been holding the land adversely
and in hostility against the true owner by submitting the usual issue
on limitation and by instructing the jury. The Court said that the
proper instruction would be that in order for the adverse claimants
to have had peaceable and adverse possession they must have held
possession of the land for the full ten-year period, adversely and in
hostility to the claim of the true owner, and further that unless it
is found from a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse
claimant had so held such land adversely and in hostility to the
claims of the true owner, the answer to the issue should be in the
negative.
It is submitted that no such instruction was necessary. The court
had defined "adverse possession" in the statutory language, using the
phrase "inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another." If
the jury, in response to the principal issue, had found that the ad-
verse claimant had held peaceable and adverse possession for the sta-
tutory period, they necessarily would have also found, under the
definition of adverse possession, that the claimant's possession was
actual and visible and was commenced and continued under a claim
of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another.
Judge Critz recognized that the word "another" included the
record owner. Such being the case, there was no need for further
instruction to the jury. The confusion arose out of the use of the
word "another." It probably would have been better to have used
the name of the true owner. The issue which brought about the con-
flict in the jury's finding was not an ultimate issue, but was evi-
dentiary and a different shade of meaning from the main issue and
should not have been submitted.
The court in Viduarri v. Bruni,"5 instead of submitting a special
issue on recognition, gave the following special instruction:
"In connection with Special Issue No. 1, you are instructed that if
you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that at the times
after 1901, when Bruni and those holding under him secured deeds
from some of the heirs of Manuela Borrego de Viduarri and persons
claiming under them, they were merely seeking to quiet their possession
of said lands or protect themselves from adverse litigation with refer-
ence thereto, such purchases would not constitute recognition that the
heirs of Manuela Viduarri from whom they had not acquired title, had
valid interests in the lands in controversy.
55 179 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.
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"On the other hand, if by making such purchases Bruni and those
holding under him were not merely seeking to quiet their possession or
to avoid litigation with reference to said lands, but were buying what
they conceded to be valid interests therein, then such purchases would
constitute a recognition of valid interests in the other heirs of Manuela
Viduarri from whom they had not acquired title.
"You are further instructed in this connection, that if Bruni and
those holding under him after 1901, recognized valid interests in the
lands in controversy to be in some of the heirs of Manuela Viduarri
and those holding under them, Bruni's and plaintiff's possession would
not be adverse to such defendants, heirs of Manuela Viduarri, from
whom they had not acquired title and those holding under them so
long as such recognition continued."56
The record owner excepted to the instructions, and requested the
submission of a special issue on recognition. On appeal the instruc-
tions were approved and the requested issue denied. The case will be
further noted.
Again, in Cook v. Hutto57 the court held that the true owner was
entitled to the submission of a special issue on recognition and that
the general instructions did not deprive him of that right. Under the
holding in Pearson v. Doherty it was not necessary to submit an
issue on recognition, since the issue was encompassed in the definition
of peaceable and adverse possession.
If possession were commenced in privity with, or in recognition
of the owner's title, the statute would not begin to run until there
had been a repudiation of the owner's title and the adverse claimant
had brought home to the owner actual or constructive notice of such
repudiation. 8 The burden is on the adverse claimant to prove repudi-
ation and notice to the owner.
In Brown v. Bickford" the court submitted the usual issue on the
ten-year statute, followed by the following explanatory charge on
constructive notice:
"You are hereby instructed in connection with the Special Issue No.
1 (relating to the ten-year statute) that the possession of the defendant
and cross-plaintiff Bickford could not be adverse until June 1, 1926
(the date of the foreclosure sale), nor thereafter until such notice of
such adverse possession was given to the record owner of the land.
"By 'notice' is not necessarily meant actual notice of such adverse
possession and claim, but such notice may be presumed by the jury to
56Id. at 821.
57 151 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 139 Tex. 571, 164
S.W.2d 513 (1942).
"SMhoon v. Cain, 77 Tex. 316, 14 S.W. 24 (1890); Houk v. Kirby Petroleum
Corp., 65 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
'9 237 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
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have been brought home to the record owner of the title if the jury
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse occupancy,
if any, and claim of title, if any, on the part of the said Will Bickford
was open, notorious, exclusive and unequivocal for such a length of
time as to be inconsistent with the existence of title in such record
owner, and of such notoriety as to constitute notice to the record
owner and those under whom the record owner claims title of the ad-
verse possession, if any, and claim of title, if any, of the said Will
Bickford. The inference of notice is one of fact to be determined by
the jury."'
On appeal the court said that the instruction seemed to be sup-
ported by a number of reported cases, but reversed and rendered the
judgment because the evidence was insufficient to show either actual
or constructive notice of the tenant's repudiation.
The same rule which applies with reference to repudiation by a
tenant and notice to the landlord also applies with reference to co-
tenants."' In Viduarri v. Bruni0 the court, in connection with sub-
mitting a special issue under the ten-year statute, gave the following
instruction:
"In connection with Special Issue No. 1 you are instructed that
A. M. Bruni by the purchase of an individed interest of 38,000 acres of
land more or less in the Borrego Grant from Trinidad Cuellar de
Viduarri, et al, the surviving wife and children of Lauriano Viduarri,
described in the deed dated August 3, 1885, became a cotenant or
tenant in common of such of the other heirs of Manuela Borrego de
Viduarri, whose interests he had not purchased, and his possession
would be presumed to have been in the right of the common title and
not adverse to his cotenants unless and until he repudiated the title of
his cotenants to any interest in the particular tracts of land in con-
troversy and held the same adversely to the title of said cotenants, if
you find he did so, and until he gave notice of such repudiation and
adverse claim, if any, to said cotenants. Cotenancy or tenancy in com-
mon means where two or more parties own undivided interests in the
same tract or tracts of land.
"It was not necessary for the said A. M. Bruni and plaintiffs to give
actual notice to said cotenants of such repudiation and adverse holding
if any, but such notice may be presumed by the jury to have been
brought home to the cotenants if the jury find from a preponderance
of the evidence that the adverse occupancy, if any, and claim of title,
if any, on the part of the said A. M. Bruni and plaintiffs was open,
notorious, exclusive and unequivocal for such a length of time as to be
inconsistent with the existence of title in such cotenants and of such
'0 Id. at 766.
"
1 Bordages v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 129 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error
dism., judg. cor.
62 179 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.
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notoriety as to constitute notice to the defendants and those under
whom they claim title; the inference of notice being one of fact to be
determined by the jury.""3
The true owner requested the submission of special issues on actual
and constructive notice and objected to the instructions given on
the ground they were on the weight of the evidence. The court held
the request and objection were properly overruled and relied upon
Rule 277 for its authority. It said:
Since the adoption of the rule above quoted from, it is not reversible
error for a trial court to give an instruction in the nature of a general
charge in a special issue case, provided such charge or instruction is
'necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict'
upon the issues submitted to it.
It seems readily apparent that the submission of Special Issue No. 1
by itself would not have constituted a comprehensive submission of
the question of limitation under the facts of this case ....
While the special issue submitted in the main followed the wording
of the ten-year statute and may be said to embrace the controlling fact
consideration upon this phase of the case, it is clear that something
else was necessary to enable the jury to render an intelligent verdict or
finding. The trial court sought to supply this obvious deficiency by
the use of special instructions. Appellants contend that the trial court
should have submitted additional special issues instead of using the spe-
cial instructions ....
It is perhaps possible that the limitation features of this case could
have been submitted to the jury by the use of a number of separate
issues, and that had such a method of submission been selected, it
would not have been necessary to also submit certain of the explana-
tory instructions which were actually given by the trial court. How-
ever, we do not understand the rule to mean that simply because a
theory of recovery or defense may be submitted by means of numerous
special issues without explanatory instructions, it follows therefore that
explanatory instructions are to be classed as 'unnecessary' when given
by a court in order to enable it to submit a theory to the jury upon a
lesser number of special issues.
It seems that the expression 'necessary to enable the jury to properly
pass upon and render a verdict upon such issues' employed by the rule
allows the trial judge some choice of method with reference to the
submission of a theory of recovery or defense. It is clear that 'the rule
affords a greater latitude to the trial judge than did the Statute.' 4
"Peaceable possession" and "adverse possession" are legal terms
which, under Rule 277, should be defined in the charge when spe-
cial issues involving three-, five-, ten-, or twenty-five-year statutes




are submitted to the jury."5 In most cases, definitions similar to those
contained in articles 5514 and 5515 are sufficient."6
The following definitions embodying the language of the statutes
have been approved by the appellate courts:
By peaceable possession is meant continuous possession, uninterrupted
by any adverse suit to recover the estate ....
By adverse possession is meant actual and visible appropriation of the
land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent
with and hostile to the claim of another. 7
The phraseology may vary so long as the substance is not changed
from the statutory provisions. It is preferable when defining "peace-
able possession" to use the clause "by any adverse suit to recover the
land" instead of "by any adverse suit to recover the estate." It also
would be better when defining "adverse possession" to use the clause
"hostile to the claim of defendant (or plaintiff) and those under
whom he holds" instead of "hostile to the claim of another." Defini-
tions containing these clauses will suffice. 6
In Houston Oil Company v. Stepney" it was held that a defi-
nition of adverse possession embodying the phrase "claim of another"
was not misleading or suggestive that the adverse claimant could be
claiming adversely to someone other than the true owner, particu-
larly in view of the special issue as to whether the adverse claimant
had claimed the land adversely to the opposing party.
Again, it has been held" that it is reversible error to enlarge upon
the statutory definition of "peaceable possession" by adding "and
which may be acquired by such visible acts of ownership as will give
notice to the owner; and such possession may also be shown by actual
tenancy under the person so claiming." The definition is not in con-
formity with the statute and places on the adverse claimant a great-
er burden than is required by law.
It will be noted that in the statutory definitions of "peaceable pos-
session" and "adverse possession" there are also used the terms "con-
65Shellhammer v. Caruthers, 149 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
66See Viduarri v. Bruni, 179 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.;
Batson Oil Co. v. Jordan, 104 S. W.2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Krause
v. Young, 6 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Southwestern Lumber Co. v. Allison,
261 S.W. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 276 S.W. 418 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1925); Collins v. Megason, 228 S.W. 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); 2 Tex.
Jur. Adverse Possession § 185 (1929).6 7 Viduarri v. Bruni, 179 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.;
see also Broughton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 105 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
error ref.
66Halsey v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 66 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error
dism.
69 187 S.W. 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref.
"'Pinchback v. Hockless, 138 Tex. 306, 158 S.W.2d 997 (1942).
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tinuous possession," "actual and visible appropriation of the land,"
"commenced and continued," "claim of right," and "hostile." The
legal significance of some of these terms may not be known to a jury.
Their meaning to the layman may be quite different from their
legal meaning. The question, therefore, arises as to whether they are
legal terms which should be defined in the charge.
In White v. Haynes" the court held that had the jury been bur-
dened with explanations of all of these terms, the definitions of "ad-
verse possession" and "peaceable possession" would have been ex-
tended to such an extent that the jury would have been lost in the
realm of distraction and that instead of the definitions being an aid
to them in an understanding of the legal terms, they would have
had the reverse effect.
The facts in a case may render imperative definitions of some of
these terms. The word "continuous" has a dictionary meaning of
"without break, cessation, or interruption; unbroken." The legal
meaning is quite different. There may be a break in the possession
and yet the possession will be continuous within the meaning of the
statutes. Continuity of possession is not broken by a temporary va-
cancy if there is no intention to abandon the premises.' Possession
is said to be continuous if the break is not unreasonable."a The run-
ning of the statute is not stopped even though the premises are left
vacant for a short time between the removal of the tenant and the
entry of his successor, if there is no intention to abandon the pos-
session.'" In Whitehead v. Foley" the Court said:
A short and temporary vacation of the premises is the ordinary and
frequently the unavoidable incident of the change of tenants. If the
attendant circumstances are such, that a reasonable and prudent man
would not be induced to suppose the possession has been abandoned, it
cannot be insisted that the running of the statute has been inter-
rupted."
If the facts in a case should show breaks in the possession of the
adverse claimant, the court should charge the jury on the meaning
of the word "continuous." The following definition should be suf-
ficient:
7' 60 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
'
5 Wickizer v. Williams, 173 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914), aff'd on rehearing, 173
S.W. 1162 (1915) error ref.; Collier v. Couts, 45 S.W. 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898),
rev'd on other grounds, 92 Tex. 234, 47 S.W. S25 (1898).
"2 Tex. Jur. Adverse Possession § 81 (1929).
74 Whitehead v. Foley, 28 Tex. 1 (1866); Hufstedler v. Sides, 165 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942) error ref.; 2 Tex. Jur. Adverse Possession § 82 (1929).




"Continuous possession" means such possession as has been continued
without the land being permanently vacated, or temporarily vacated
for a period of time long enough to induce a reasonably prudent person
to believe that the possession had been abandoned.
The word "continuously" was defined in Allison v. California Pe-
troleum Corporation77 in connection with the submission of the five-
year statute. The issue was whether the defendant had held peaceable
and adverse possession of the land "continuously cultivating, using
or enjoying the same" for any consecutive period of five years.
"Continuously" was defined as follows: " 'A temporary cessation in
the cultivation, use or enjoyment of the land or part thereof, during
the time intervening between the gathering of a crop and the prepa-
ration for or planting of a crop the following season would not con-
stitute any failure to continuously cultivate, use or enjoy the
land.' .... On appeal it was said that the definition was not to be
recommended, but that the case would not be reversed because of
the definition in view of the unnecessary employment of the term
"continuously" in the special issues. The court reaffirmed the rule
that a temporary cessation between the time of gathering crops and
the preparation for and planting crops would not break the con-
tinuity of possession.
If the term "continuous possession" were not defined when the
evidence showed a temporary break in possession, the jury might
accept the dictionary definition and find against the adverse claim-
ant, even though the claimant had in law been in possession for the
statutory period.
Instead of defining the term, a special issue could be submitted to
the jury involving the elements of continuous possession. The only
disadvantage is that it might lead to conflicting answers to two issues.
If such issue were submitted it should be conditioned upon a finding
that the adverse claimant had held peaceable and adverse possession
for the stautory period, and could be framed as follows:
Did the plaintiff vacate the land, if you believe he did vacate the
land, during the period you have found in response to Special Issue
No. 1 that he was in peaceable and adverse possession of the land, if
you have so found, for a long enough time to induce a reasonably pru-
dent person to believe that the possession had been abandoned?
The issue should then be followed by an instruction that the burden
of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the negative of the issue. A
77 158 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.7 1 Id. at 601.
[Vol. 13
THE COURT'S CHARGE
definition of "actual and visible appropriation of land" would seem
to be unnecessary in the ordinary case.
The courts have in a number of cases defined the terms "under a
claim of right" and "hostile." It is doubtful if the definitions were
necessary. In Allison v. California Petroleum Corporation9 these
terms were defined as follows:
"By the term 'claim of right,' as used in the main charge of the
court, is meant that entry upon and possession of the land in contro-
versy by defendants, or by those under whom they hold, shall have
been with the intent to claim the land as his or her own, as the case
may have been ....
"The word 'hostile,' as used in the special issue herein, means a hold-
ing with intent to claim it as his own to the exclusion of all others.""0
The definitions were not challenged. The word "hostile" is de-
fined erroneously, because too great a burden is placed on the ad-
verse claimant. He is not required to claim the land "to the exclu-
sion of all others." He is only required to claim title as his own and
to the exclusion of the record title owner; or, stated differently, to
the exclusion of the opposing party and those under whom he claims
title. To require the adverse claimant to claim the land to the exclu-
sion of all others is the same as requiring him to claim the land ad-
verse to the whole world, which he is not required to do. It is well
settled in Texas that possession need not be adverse and hostile as to
all the world, but only as the true owner."
"Claim of right" has been held to mean "an intention to claim the
land as his ow n.
''s
8
The word "hostile" has been defined as meaning "an occupancy of
the premises under a holding by the possessor as owner, and therefore
against all other claimants of the land."'" If it should be necessary
to define the term "hostile," a definition that it means a claim made
with the intention of holding the land as his own should sufice.
Peaceable and adverse possession need not be continued by the
same person, but where it is continued by different persons succes-
sively there must be a privity of estate between them." If the ad-
verse claimant seeks to tack the possessions of different persons for
71Id. at 599.
80 Ibid.
81Smith v. Jones, 103 Tex. 632, 132 S.W. 469 (1910); Moran v. Wallace, 171 S.W.2d
149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.; Petty v. Griffin, 241 S.W. 252 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922) error dism.; contra, Johnson v. Martinez, 18 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) error dism.
82Petty v. Griffin, 241 S.W. 252, 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.





the purpose of completing the bar, he must show that privity of es-
tate existed between them. The word "privity" means privity of
possession-not privity of title-because the adverse claimant has
no title until the bar falls. 5
Where the adverse claimant seeks to tack the successive possessions
of several persons, the issue has usually been submitted so as to in-
quire whether the adverse claimant and those under whom he claims
has had peaceable and adverse possession. However, the Court of
Civil Appeals in Overton Refining Company v. Harmon" held that
such an issue was insufficient. In that case the ten-year statute was
submitted inquiring whether the "plaintiffs and those under whom
they claim" had held peaceable and adverse possession. The issue was
followed by statutory definitions of "peaceable possession" and "ad-
verse possession" and by the instruction that "Peaceable and adverse
possession need not be continued in the same person, but when held
by different persons successively there must be a privity of estate
between them."'"
It will be noted that the instruction is identical with the statute."
The court held that the trial court should have defined privity of
estate and followed the definition with a special issue requested by
the record owner as to whether one of the persons whose possession
was sought to be tacked to the possession of another had claimed
the land when he took possession.
To meet the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in the Harmon
case, the issue might be submitted so as to inquire whether the de-
fendant "and those in privity of estate with him" have held peace-
able and adverse possession of the land. The issue should be accom-
panied by the following instruction:
Peaceable and adverse possession need not be continued in the same
person, but when held by different persons successively there must be a
privity of estate between them. Privity of estate means privity of pos-
session, and privity of possession exists between successive occupants
when the earlier occupants' possession and claim passed or was transfer-
red to the latter occupant by agreement, gift, devise or inheritance.
If an issue involving the five-year statute were submitted, instead
of using "by agreement, gift, devise or inheritance" it should be "by
deed duly registered, devise or inheritance." Under the five-year
"Hutto v. Cook, 139 Tex. 571, 164 S.W.2d 513 (1942); Free v. Owen, 131 Tex.
281, 113 S.W.2d 1221 (1938).
8881 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 130 Tex. 365, 109
S.W.2d 457 (1937), aff'd on rehearing, 130 Tex. 365, 110 S.W.2d 555 (1937).
,




statute, the claimant in order to tack periods of possession, must
show a concurrence of the statutory requirements as to possession
and registration of deeds. That is, the deed under which each occu-
pant held must have been duly registered.'
B. The Three-Year Statute
The adverse claimant in order to mature a title under the three-
year statute" must have held "peaceable and adverse possession" un-
der "title or color of title" for the statutory period. "Title" is de-
fined in article 5508 as a "regular chain of transfers from or under
the sovereignty of the soil." "Color of title" is defined in the same
article as "a consecutive chain of such transfers down to such per-
son in possession, without being regular, as if one or more of the
memorials or muniments be not registered, or not duly registered,
or be only in writing, or such like defect as may not extend to or
include the want of intrinsic fairness and honesty; or when the
party in possession shall hold the same by a certificate of headright,
land warrant, or land scrip, with a chain of transfer down to him
in possession."
Whether the adverse claimant has a "title" or "a color of title" is
ordinarily a question of law for the court, and not of fact for the
jury; but whether he has been in peaceable and adverse possession
for the statutory period is usually a question of fact. If the undis-
puted evidence would support a conclusion of law that the adverse
claimant had a "title" or "a color of title" within the meaning of
the statute but there remained a question of fact as to whether the
claimant had been in peaceable and adverse possession for the statu-
tory period, only the disputed issue of fact should be submitted to
the jury. The following form would be sufficient:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
[or defendant], either in person or through a tenant or tenants, or
partly in person or partly through a tenant or tenants, has held peace-
able and adverse possession of the lands in controversy for any period
of three consecutive years prior to January 1, 1952 [date of filing of
suit] and subsequent to January 1, 1910 [the date adverse possession
commenced]?
It would not be necessary to include in the issue the clause referring
to a tenant or tenants if the adverse claimant had actually occupied
the premises.
If an issue of fact has arisen as to whether the adverse claimant
'9 Daugherty v. Manning, 221 S.W. 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error dism.; 2 Tex.




has "title" or "a color of title," the issue must be resolved by the
jury. This could be done in one of two ways: (1) the court could
submit a special issue involving the disputed issue of fact followed
by another issue inquiring whether the claimant had held peaceable
and adverse possession for the statutory period; or (2) the court
could define in the language of the statute "title" and "color of
title" and follow such definitions by an issue as to whether the ad-
verse claimant had held peaceable and adverse possession under
"title" or "color of title" for the statutory period.
The latter procedure would be less desirable because it would leave
to the jury a determination of whether plaintiff is holding under a
regular chain of transfers from or under the sovereignty of the
soil or a consecutive chain of transfers without the transfers being
regular due to some instrument not having been registered or duly
registered, or some like defect not extending to the want of intrinsic
fairness and honesty. Every lawyer who has faced a jury composed
of a barber, a farmer, a plumber, and a professional whittler can
well visualize the utter consternation and bewilderment that would
follow the reading of a charge defining in the language of the statute
"title" and "color of title."
C. The Five-Year Statute
The adverse claimant to mature a title under the five-year statute
must have had peaceable and adverse possession of the land in con-
troversy, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, and paying taxes
thereon, and claiming under a deed or deeds duly registered for the
statutory period."
The terms "duly registered" and "paying taxes thereon" are legal
terms which should be defined when the five-year statute is sub-
mitted. They were defined in Allison v. California Petroleum Cor-
poration"' as follows:
" 'Paying taxes thereon,' means paying from year to year as the taxes
accrue and before they are delinquent, and includes all taxes assessed
against the land ....
"The term 'duly registered' means that such deed or deeds must
have been filed in the office of the county clerk of Gregg County,
Texas."9
The special issue on the five-year statute is usually submitted in
the following language:"
9' Art. 5509.
92 158 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.
"3 Ibid.
"Harris v. Wood County Cotton Oil Co., 222 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
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Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
[or defendant] either in person or through a tenant or tenants, or part-
ly in person or partly through a tenant or tenants, has held peaceable
and adverse possession of the lands in controversy, cultivating, using or
enjoying the same, or any part thereof, and paying taxes thereon, and
claiming under a deed or deeds duly registered for any period of five
consecutive years prior to January 1, 1952 [date of filing suit]?
It is error to use in the issue the term "cultivating, using and en-
joying." The statute is in the disjunctive, and or must be used."'
D. The Ten-Year Statute
To mature a title under the ten-year statute, the adverse claimant
must affirmatively show (1) peaceable and adverse possession, and
(2) cultivation, use or enjoyment. Unlike under the three- and
five-year statutes, he need not show that he has a title or color of
title or that he is claiming under a deed duly registered. How-
ever, if he is claiming under a deed or some other written memo-
randum of title duly registered which fixes the boundaries of his
claim, his possession will be coextensive with the boundaries specified
in the instrument. If he is not in possession under a deed or some
other written memorandum of title, then he is naked possessor and
his possession is restricted to not more than 160 acres including his
improvements, or to the number of acres actually inclosed, should
he have inclosed more than 160 acres. 9
In a majority of the cases which reach the courts today the ad-
verse claimant is holding under a deed or some other written memo-
randum of title duly registered. His actual possession gives notice
of his adverse claim, but the recorded deed or other recorded memo-
randum of title aids the possession as a means of notice and affords
information as to the character and extent of his claim."
The authorities are in harmony in holding that a written memo-
randum of title which is insufficient to constitute a deed must be
duly registered, but there is a conflict as to whether a deed must be
duly registered in order for the adverse claimant's possession to be
coextensive with the boundaries described in the deed."9 The cases
error ref. n.r.e.; California Petroleum Corp. v. Allison, 158 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.; White v. Haynes, 60 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
error dism.; Collins v. Megason, 228 S.W. 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
9SHess v. Webb, 113 S.W. 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), aff'd 103 Tex. 46, 123
S.W. 111 (1909).
"'Hays v. Hinkle, 193 S.W. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.
9 7 Schleiher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270, 275, 20 S.W. 120, 123 (1892).
"SMcKee v. Stewart, 139 Tex. 260, 162 S.W.2d 948 (1942).
9 Holding that the deed need not be recorded, see Hays v. Hinkle, 193 S.W. 153
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref. Contra Harvey v. Humphreys, 178 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.; Odem v. Leahy, 264 S.W. 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924);
Donald v. Stanfield, 197 S.W. 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.
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are consistent in the holding that the deed or memorandum of title
is sufficient even though void or ineffectual as a conveyance, provid-
ing the land is adequately described.' °
The payment of taxes by the claimant is not necessary under the
ten-year statute, and an instruction to the contrary is prejudicial
error."' Nevertheless, the payment of taxes is a circumstance which
supports the adverse claim, and evidence of payment is admissible.
If the adverse claimant is not holding under a deed or other me-
morandum of title fixing the boundaries, then, under article 5510,
the amount of land that he can acquire is confined to 160 acres in-
cluding his improvements, or the number of acres actually inclosed
should he have inclosed more than 160 acres. He can, under the pe-
culiar provisions of the ten-year statute, mature a limitation title to
160 acres without showing actual occupancy of the entire 160 acres,
provided his improvements are on the 160 acres. The 160-acre pro-
vision of the statute was founded upon the policy of forcing the
owners of land to take possession and settle the country,"' and to
that extent is quite different from the general policy that the limita-
tion statutes are intended to suppress litigation and are statutes of
repose.
Of course, if the record owner is in possession of any part of the
160 acres the adverse claimant's recovery will be limited to the part
in the adverse claimant's actual possession."4
If the adverse possessor has not claimed a specific 160 acres, he can
mature a limitation title to an undivided 160 acres and is entitled
to have a specific 160 acres set aside to him. His adverse possession
vests him with title to 160 acres where he has claimed no specific
160-acre tract, but the statute does not provide how the boundaries
of his tract will be established except that his improvements must
be included within such boundaries. Consequently, the adverse
claimant, after he has matured a limitation title to an undivided
160 acres, cannot sell a specific 160 acres, but like all other tenants
in common, he has a right to have the lands partitioned. "
Where the adverse claimant has been in possession of more than
160 acres without claiming the land under a deed or without having
the land inclosed, the issue should be framed so as to inquire whether
1"°Harris v. Igleliart, 113 S.W. 170, 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
0' Gotoskey v. Grawunder, 158 S.W. 249, 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
102 Bracken v. Jones, 63 Tex. 184, 186 (1885).
"° Snow v. Starr, 75 Tex. 411, 419, 12 S.W. 673 (1889).
104 Lynch Davidson & Co. v. Beasley, 128 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
10aW. T. Carter & Bro. v. Wells, 130 Tex. 189, 106 S.W.2d 10l0 (1937); Louisiana
& Tex. Lumber Co. v. Kennedy, 103 Tex. 297, 126 S.W. 1110 (1910).
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the adverse claimant has held peaceable and adverse possession of the
lands in controversy, cultivating, using or enjoying the same for
any period of ten consecutive years. A finding favorable to the ad-
verse claimant would entitle him to a judgment, not for the lands
actually in his possession where the quantity exceeded 160 acres, but
for an undivided 160 acres in the whole.00
If the adverse claimant is claiming a specific 160 acres, he is en-
titled to have an issue submitted to the jury involving the 160 acres,
even though he has not been cultivating, using or enjoying all of the
160 acres. The statutes permit him to claim the lands inclosed where
there is less than 160 acres, with his improvements and enough ad-
ditional land to make 160 acres. '
Issues involving the adverse claimant's claim to 160 acres were
submitted to the jury in Petty v. Griffin... and may be found in the
court's opinion. No objections were leveled at the issues, but there
are many defects in them which would have required a reversal had
objections been timely and properly made.
To mature a title to a tract under the ten-year statute it is not
necessary that the tract be fenced or inclosed,'" except where the
tract is used for grazing or is entirely surrounded by other lands
owned, claimed, or fenced by the adverse claimant, or adjoins 5,000
or more acres of land owned or claimed by the adverse claimant."0
If the tract is fenced and the adverse claimant is not claiming under
a deed, the peaceable and adverse possession will be construed to
embrace the number of acres actually inclosed."' To the extent the
lands are inclosed, the claimant holds what is termed "actual posses-
sion."'' . A use of a part of tract inclosed, coupled, with a claim to
the whole tract, will mature a title under the ten-year statute to all
of the land inclosed.'13
Where the tract claimed adversely is surrounded by lands owned,
claimed, or fenced by another person, the possession of the circum-
scribing land by the other person will not mature a title to the cir-
cumscribed tract under the ten-year statute, unless the tract is seg-
regated and separated from the circumscribing lands by a fence, or
lO6W. T. Carter & Bro. v. Wells, 130 Tex. 189, 106 S.W.2d 1050 (1937).
107Houston Oil Co. v. McGrew, 107 Tex. 220, 176 S.W.2d 45 (1950); Lutcher v.
Reed, 237 S.W. 913 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Oliver v. West Lumber Co., 287 S.W.
100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error dism.
108 241 S.W. 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error dism.
"McCall v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., 143 Tex. 490, 186 S.W.2d 677 (1945).
11 Arts. 5511-12.
"'Art. 5510.
112Evitts v. Roth, 61 Tex. 81 (1884).
'
11 Washam v. Harrison, 122 S.W. 52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
unless at least one-tenth of it is cultivated and used for agricultural
purposes or used for manufacturing purposes."' Whether the tract
is circumscribed by the land of another is usually a question of law
for the court, but whether the circumscribed tract is fenced, or at
least one-tenth is cultivated and used for agricultural purposes, may
be a question of fact for the jury, necessitating the submission of a
special issue.
In Pinchback v. Hockless"' the trial court submitted to the jury
the following issue:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the tract
of land in controversy in this suit was entirely surrounded by a tract
or tracts of land owned, claimed or fenced by the defendants, R. T.
Pinchback and wife, from 1911 to the present time?""'
Where the tract claimed adversely is inclosed with 5,000 or more
acres of land, the adverse claimant cannot mature a title under the
ten-year statute unless the tract is segregated and separated by a sub-
stantial fence from the 5,000 acres, or unless at least one-tenth of the
tract is cultivated and used for agricultural purposes or for manufac-
turing purposes, or unless there is an actual possession thereof."7
Whether the tract is inclosed with 5,000 acres or more of land is gen-
erally a question of law for the court, but there may be a question of
fact requiring the submission of a special issue as to whether at least
one-tenth of the tract is cultivated and used for agricultural pur-
poses, or whether the adverse claimant has been in actual possession
of such tract.
Where the adverse claimant is claiming a tract of land under a
deed or some written memorandum of title and there is no dispute
about the adverse claimant having a deed to the land, but there is a
disputed issue of fact as to whether the claimant has had peaceable
and adverse possession of the land for the statutory period, the fol-
lowing special issue would be sufficient:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
either in person or through a tenant or tenants, or partly in person and
partly through a tenant or tenants, has held peaceable and adverse pos-
session of the lands in controversy, cultivating, using or enjoying the
same for any period of ten consecutive years prior to January 1, 1952
[date of filing suit]?
114 Art. 5511.
... 137 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), rev'd, 138 Tex. 306, 158 S.W.2d 997
(1942).




If the adverse claimant has not been cultivating, using or enjoy-
ing every acre of land described in his deed, nevertheless under
article 5 510 his peaceable possession will be construed to be coexten-
sive with the boundaries specified in his deed. Under those circum-
stances, the issue might be framed as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiff ... [etc.] has held peaceable and adverse possession of the lands
in controversy, cultivating, using or enjoying the same, or any part
thereof, and claiming under a deed, or some written memorandum of
title duly registered, for any period of ten consecutive years ...?
In Cook v. Hutto"' the issue was submitted to the jury as follows:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiffs, and those under whom they claim, either in person or through
tenants, have had and held peaceable and adverse possession of the
property in controversy, using, cultivating, or enjoying the same, for
any period of ten consecutive years prior to the filing of this suit on
September 2, 1939?""'
In Pinchback v Hockless..° the court submitted the issue as fol-
lows:
"Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendants, R. T. Pinchback and wife, either in person or through a
tenant or tenants, or those under whom they claim, either in person
or through a tenant or tenants, have held peaceable and adverse posses-
sion of the land in controversy, cultivating, using and enjoying the
the same, for any period of ten consecutive years, after December 12,
1901, and before December 12, 1921?...
The issue is erroneous in that the conjunctive and instead of the
disjunctive or is used in connection with "cultivating, using and en-
joying" the same.
In the Pinchback case the adverse claimant claimed that he and
those under whom he claimed had been in peaceable and adverse pos-
session of the land for forty-seven years. The court, in submitting
the ten-year statute, submitted three issues, each inquiring about
separate and distinct periods of time during the forty-seven-year
period. The Supreme Court held that the adverse claimant was en-
titled to have the question of his adverse claim submitted in a single
issue and it was erroneous to break the issues down to three periods.
.. 151 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 139 Tex.
571, 164 S.W.2d 513 (1942).
"9 Id. at 644.
"0137 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), rev'd, 138 Tex. 306, 158 S.W.2d 997(1942).
121 Id. at 866.
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The Court also held that one of the issues submitted was evidentiary
and not an ultimate controlling issue and was upon the weight of the
evidence. The issue, in effect, was whether the adverse claimant, who
was the defendant, had repudiated plaintiff's title. It was pointed
out that evidence of repudiation of the title was only part of the
evidence to be considered by the jury in determining the ultimate
issue of whether the defendant had matured his title under the stat-
ute during the long period of occupancy.
If the adverse claimant has not been claiming the land under a
deed or some written memorandum of title duly registered, and has
'not been cultivating all of the land, but only a part, and there is evi-
dence showing that the land has been inclosed, the following issue
would suffice:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
• .. [etc.] has held peaceable and adverse possession of the lands in
controversy, under an inclosure, cultivating, using or enjoying the same,
or any part thereof, for any period of ten consecutive years .. . [etc.] ?
The court should then instruct the jury on what constitutes an
inclosure. The following instruction might suffice in the ordinary
case:
In connection with the term "under an inclosure" you are instructed
that in order for lands to be held under an inclosure the lands must
be inclosed by fences, or partly by fences and partly by natural bar-
riers, such as rivers, mountains or cliffs, which are sufficient to pre-
vent cattle from escaping from or entering onto the lands, and are
sufficient to give notice to defendant [or plaintiff] of the plaintiff's
[or defendant's] hostile claim to the lands, if you find and believe he
was making a hostile claim to the land. To constitute an inclosure
the fences must have been reasonably maintained and any temporary
breaks or gaps must have been repaired within a reasonable length of
time.
In Halsey v. Humble Oil & Refining Company... the court sub-
mitted an issue to the jury involving the ten-year statute. The ad-
verse claimant was claiming under a deed which fixed the boundaries
of the land. There was a disputed issue of fact as to whether the ad-
verse claimant had been in possession of the land for the statutory
period. The lands were used by the adverse claimant for pasturing
stock and at times the fences were down and at other times the lands
were covered by overflow from the Trinity River. The court in-
structed the jury in connection with the special issue on the ten-year
statute that if they should find that during certain periods there were
'22 66 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
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gaps or breaks in the fence, but that the gaps or breaks were only
temporary and were repaired in a reasonable length of time, thensuch
temporary gaps or breaks in the fence would not prevent the use and
enjoyment which the defendants had made of the lands from being
regarded as continous and uninterrupted, or from being regarded as
actual and physical appropriation of the land. The court further
charged the jury that if they found that the defendants were pre-
vented from pasturing cattle by overflow from the Trinity River
and the overflow hid the fences from view, and they further found
that such periods of time were not unreasonable under all the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances, that the fact that the overflow at
times prevented the pasturing of cattle and hid the fences would not
prevent the use and enjoyment which defendants, and those under
whom they hold, made of the land from being regarded as continous
and uninterrupted. The court also instructed the jury on what con-
stituted a substantial inclosure and what constituted peaceable and
adverse possession. The instructions are very long and constitute a
substantially correct statement of the law on adverse possession. The
court held the instructions were proper and were not upon the
weight of the evidence and did not give undue emphasis to the evi-
dence of the adverse claimant.
In Broughton v. Humble Oil & Refining Company... the court
submitted to the jury the following special issue:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiff, Herbert Broughton, had been in peaceable, adverse, and continuous
possession of the land in controversy, using the same as a pasture for
grazing purposes for any period of ten consecutive years or more prior
to the 16th day of December, 1934?',
1 4
In connection with the issue, the court further charged the jury:
"You are further instructed that in order to find that the plaintiff
used the land in controversy as a pasture for grazing purposes, as that
phrase is used in Special Issue No. 1, you must find and believe from
a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff had the land in con-
troversy, either alone or with other lands, completely enclosed for any
continuous period of ten consecutive years before the 16th day of
December, 1934, with a substantial fence capable of retaining and
excluding cattle of ordinary disposition, and that he pastured cattle
within said enclosure, if any, for said period.
"You are further instructed that if you believe from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that Dickinson Bayou, during the period inquired
about, constituted a natural barrier to the passage of cattle, then it
123 105 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.
2
4 Id. at 482.
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would not be necessary that plaintiff should fence the land actually
bordering on said bayou in order to enclose same completely."'2 5
Objections were made to the instructions upon the ground that
they constituted a comment upon the weight of the evidence, were
confusing and misleading, and no definition was given of the term
"natural barrier," but the objections were overruled, and on appeal
the court held that the objections were without merit.
Special issues involving the ten-year statute must be submitted in
such form as will result in a finding by the jury upon the disputed
issues of fact. There are many opinions of the appellate courts which
contain verbatim the issues submitted to the jury."' The issues found
in these opinions may be helpful in submitting a case to the jury,
but they should be carefully analyzed to ascertain whether they are
sufficient when considered in connection with the particular facts in
the case.
An issue is not multifarious because there is embodied in a single
issue an inquiry as to whether the adverse claimant has held peace-
able and adverse possession of the lands in controversy, cultivating,
using or enjoying the same, and holding under a written memoran-
dum of title. All of the elements of the statute compose one ulti-
mate fact issue and should be embodied in one issue."'
E. The Twenty-five-Year Statute
The twenty-five-year statute of limitation was not enacted until
1919 and has been rarely construed. The adverse claimant in order
to mature a title under the twenty-five-year statute must have had
peaceable and adverse possession of the land for a period of twenty-
five-years, under a claim of right, in good faith, under a deed or
deeds, or instruments duly registered purporting to convey the land.
An issue involving the twenty-five-year statute might be submitted
to the jury in the following language:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
and those in privity of estate with him, either in person or through a
121Id. at 4 8 5.
126 Pinchback v. Hockless, 138 Tex. 306, 158 S.W.2d 997 (1942), reversing 137
S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Viduarri v. Bruni, 179 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944) error ref. w.o.m.; Allison v. California Petroleum Co., 158 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.; Cook v. Hutto, 151 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941), rev'd, 139 Tex. 571, 164 S.W.2d 513 (1942); Eichlitz v. Allen, 131 S.W.2d
43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judg. cor.; Broughton v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 105 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error ref.; Overton Ref. Co. v. Harmon,
81 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd, 130 Tex. 365, 109 S.W.2d 457 (1937),
aff'd on rehearing, 130 Tex. 365. 110 S.W.2d 555 (1937); Houston Oil Co. v. Stepney,
187 S.W. 1078 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) error ref.
12Davis v. Dowlen, 136 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judg. cor.
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tenant or tenants, or partly in person or partly through a tenant or
tenants, have held peaceable and adverse possession of the lands in con-
troversy, or any part thereof, for any period of twenty five consecutive
years prior to January 1, 1952 under a claim of right, in good faith,
and under a deed or deeds, or other instrument or instruments duly
registered purporting to convey such lands?
The terms "privity of estate," "peaceable possession," "adverse
possession," and "duly registered" should be defined, 2 ' and the fol-
lowing instructions in the language of the statute given:
You are instructed that the term "instrument or instruments pur-
porting to convey the lands in controversy" shall mean any instrument
in the form of a deed, or any instrument which contains language
showing an intention to convey the lands, even though such instru-
ment, for want of proper execution, or other cause, is void on its face
or in fact."'
It would appear that if the uncontradicted evidence showed that
there was of record a chain of conveyances into the adverse claimant
and those in privity of estate with him, the issue could be submitted
by eliminating the clause "under a deed or deeds or other instrument
or instruments duly registered purporting to convey such lands."
Quite frequently article 55 19a is referred to as a twenty-five-year
statute of limitation. It is not truly a limitation statute; rather, it
is a statute creating prima facie evidence of title. The article pro-
vides that if the evidence shows that the apparent record title owner
has not exercised dominion over the land or has not paid taxes
thereon one or more years during a period of twenty-five years, and
that during such period the opposing party has openly exercised
dominion over and asserted claim to the land and paid taxes thereon
annually before becoming delinquent, such fact shall constitute
prima facie proof that the title to the land has passed to the person
exercising dominion over same. The reported cases where an issue
was submitted to the jury under article 5519a are West v. Hap-
good' and Whelan v. Henderson."' In the opinion in the Hapgood
case the court stated that the jury made the following finding:
No 12: That the parties claiming under W. B. Brush have not ex-
ercised dominion over the lands or have not paid taxes thereon one or
more years during the period of 25 years next preceding May 13, 1941,
and that the defendants claiming under Worsham have openly exercised
128 See definitions of these terms supra.
129An issue in substantially this form was given in West v. Hapgood, 169 S.W.2d 204
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943), aff'd, 141 Tex. 576, 174 S.W.2d 963 (1943).
130 Ibid.
'' 137 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judg. cor.
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dominion over and asserted claim to said lands and have paid taxes
thereon annually before becoming delinquent, for as many as 25 years
during such period.'82
If there was no evidence showing that the defendant's predecessor
in title had conveyed the lands in controversy to the plaintiff's pre-
decessor in title and there was a disputed issue of fact on the essential
elements of article $519a, an issue should be submitted to the jury,
it might be submitted in the above language, or as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was
a period of 25 consective years prior to January 1, 1952, during which
defendant neither exercised dominion over the lands in controversy,
nor paid taxes thereon for one or more years, and during which plain-
tiff openly exercised dominion over and asserted claim to such lands,
paying taxes thereon?
"Paying taxes thereon" should be defined, and such a definition
has been given herein.
The issue submitted on the twenty-five-year statute in the Whelan
case is not contained in the opinion, but the court stated that the
jury found that plaintiff had exercised dominion over the land from
August 30, 1912, to August 30, 1937. An exception was taken to
the issue because the court did not define "dominion." The Texar-
kana court held that the exception was good and that the term
should have been defined. It said that it might have been defined as
follows: " 'The exercise of dominion over land is such open acts and
conduct relative thereto as evidence the claim of the right of absolute
possession, use and ownership thereof.' ,13
The court also submitted to the jury an issue as to whether the
deceased or his administratrix had executed and delivered a deed to
R. E. Rowell. The issue was followed by the following instruction:
"In connection with this issue, you are instructed that you may con-
sider any facts or circumstances in evidence before you which, in your
judgment, you deem to be worthy of consideration or weight to show
that such deed was executed and has been lost."' 34
The court held that the instruction was erroneous and reversible
error. It pointed out that the issue submitted the question of the
execution and delivery of a deed alone, and not whether a deed had
been executed and lost. It held that the instruction enlarged on the
scope of the issue, was a comment on the weight of the evidence, and
"2 169 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
133 137 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judg. cor.
I 4 Id. at 154.
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was a general charge. It disclaimed any intention to hold it was im-
proper to give the jury a charge as to circumstantial evidence.
III. BOUNDARIES
Some of the most difficult and complex issues to be submitted to
a jury in a land suit are issues of boundary. In the ordinary case in-
volving boundaries one party is contending for one line and the oth-
er party for a different line. It has been said that what are bound-
aries is a matter of law; where they are located is a matter of fact."'
Boundary cases can be divided into two classes. There is the case
involving a survey made on the ground with the lines and corners
marked by the original surveyor. Then there is the case involving
an office survey with none of the lines or corners marked on the
ground by the original surveyor.
Where the survey was made on the ground the primary object is
to "follow the footsteps of the surveyor.' ' . Whether his footsteps
have been found, or where they are located, or whether they have
been followed are issues which must be submitted to the jury. The
facts may be sharply disputed as to whether an object found fifty
years after the survey was made is the one marked or identified by
the original surveyor and called for in his field notes. If none of the
original objects can be found, then the jury must ascertain in re-
sponse to special issues whether the line contended for by the plain-
tiff or the line contended for by the defendant coincides with the
line marked by the surveyor and called for in his field notes.
Where the survey was made in an office and the field notes call
for adjoinders with senior surveys which in turn were surveyed on
the ground, the jury may be called upon to decide whether the calls
in the junior survey for adjoinders with the senior survey were made
through error or conjecture; or it may have to find where the lines
and corners of the senior survey are located on the ground.
If all of the objects called for in the field notes have disappeared,
the jury will not be able to determine which of two lines coincides
with the footsteps of the original surveyor, unless the lines have been
re-monumented on a resurvey and properly described in the pleadings
and by the surveyor in his testimony. The careful land lawyer will
throughout the trial of a boundary suit emphasize the location and
descriptions of monuments established on the resurvey so that the
.. Bolton v. Lann, 16 Tex. 96 (1856).
18 Thatcher v. Matthews, 101 Tex. 122, 105 S.W. 317 (1907); Bolton v. Lann, 16




court can submit to the jury an issue as to whether the line as re-
monumented coincides with the line called for in the original field
notes.
It is error to submit to the jury an issue as to whether the line of
a survey is located as contended for by the plaintiff or by the defend-
ant. The verdict of the jury would not furnish the means for locat-
ing the disputed boundary line on the ground. The issue would not
identify the location of the line, nor could a judgment be written
upon the verdict which would enable the sheriff to put the proper
party in possession.
It was said in Southern Pine Lumber Company v. Whiteman... in
regard to an issue inquiring whether the line was located as con-
tended for by the plaintiff, that:
Since a judgment is required, among other things, to conform to
"the verdict, if nay" . . . , it seems clear that the court should not
render judgment on a verdict which does not determine the disputed
issues in the case ....
The verdict of the jury in this case did not itself locate, nor furnish
the means of locating, the disputed boundary line on the ground ....
A judgment awarding a plaintiff recovery of a tract of land by
the same description as his title papers manifestly could have no effect
in settling a dispute as to the actual location on the ground of one or
more of the boundary lines. Hence, it is considered to be a settled
proposition that in a trespass to try title suit wherein the only con-
troversy concerns the location on the ground of a boundary line be-
tween plaintiff's land and the land of another adjoining his, it is neces-
sary to describe the disputed line by reference to objects concerning
which there can be no controversy and the verdict of the jury must
evince their finding with reference to such objects.'38
The framing of special issues in a boundary suit may often be
greatly simplified by reference to a map or plat either properly in-
troduced in evidence or included as a part of the court's charge.
Issues submitted in this form have been approved by our courts."'
In Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Owings,"' Justice Speer
of the Fort Worth court said that the submission of a boundary case
by use of a plat was obviously fraught with dangers. In that case,
all of the special issues are contained in the opinion. One of the
issues was whether the east boundary line of the survey as originally
137 104 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
138 id. at 637-38.
.. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Owings, 128 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Mid-
Kansas Oil and Gas Co. v. Burton, 87 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error granted
on other grounds and dism. by agreement; Still v. Barton, 76 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) error dism.
140 128 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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run was located at the place shown by the line CD by plaintiff's
surveyor on Exhibit No. 114. Another issue was whether the south-
west corner of the survey was located at Point G on plaintiff's Ex-
hibit No. 114. The court held that the issues were not subject to
the objection that they were on the weight of the evidence, or that
they gave undue prominence to the testimony of surveyor Hackney.
It was pointed out that if the jury had been asked in a proper ques-
tion to locate the line independently of any plat, they could not have
done so. However, the case was reversed and remanded because in
another special issue the burden was erroneously placed upon the de-
fendant and the issue had been conditionally submitted.
It is very easy to make an error in submitting an issue to the jury
based upon a map. For instance, in Maxwell v. Walters Petroleum
Corporation"' the court in its charge instructed the jury that Line
No. 1 as used in the charge purported to represent the true and cor-
rect line of the survey as the plaintiff claimed it was located in his
pleading and on the plats introduced by him, and Line No. 2 as
used in the charge purported to represent the true and correct line
of the survey as defendant claimed it was located in his pleadings
and on the plats introduced by him. The instructions were then fol-
lowed by an issue inquiring whether Line No. 1 or Line No. 2 was
the true and correct boundary line of the survey. Objections were
made to the charge and on appeal the case was reversed because of
the erroneous submission. The court held that the charge was mis-
leading and confusing, that the numerical designations were wrong,
and the pleadings of the parties were improperly referred to.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish not only the
boundaries which are in dispute, but also his title to the lands em-
braced in the boundaries. Unless he has established his title as a
matter of law, issues should also be submitted on title; otherwise, the
issues of boundary would be of no avail. "'
The proper placing of the burden of proof in framing special is-
sues on boundaries should be considered in connection with the right
of the defendant to an affirmative submission of his theories of de-
fense. If the plaintiff can show that he is in possession of the land
described in his petition, the rule is that the burden is on the de-
fendant to show that the lands are not owned by plaintiff because
they are within the boundaries of the lands owned by defendant.
The rule is founded upon the proposition that in a trespass to try
title suit where the plaintiff shows priority of possession and no title
141 120 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
... Greenlee v. Taylor, 79 Tex. 149, 14 S.W. 1056 (1890).
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is found in the defendant, plaintiff, by virtue of such possession, is
entitled to judgment.'
If the case does not turn upon priority of possession but the issues
are solely issues of boundary, a more difficult question arises. The
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show the proper location of
the lines. The defendant may deny plaintiff's location and attempt
to show a location entirely different. Would the defendant in such
event be entitled to have his defense affirmatively submitted, and, if
so, upon whom would the burden rest? There are three cases which
are in point.
In Jones-O'Brien v. Loyd." the court held the defendant was en-
titled to have submitted his theory of defense, because if the lines
were located as claimed by him, the plaintiff would not be entitled
to recover. However, the trial court placed the burden on the de-
fendant to prove that the lines were located as he contended them
to be. Judge Funderburk for the Eastland Court held the burden
had been improperly placed. He said:
The burden of proof was thus placed upon the defendants to show
that the corners were as contended by them. The law imposed upon
the plaintiffs the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that said corners were as contended by plaintiffs. If the cor-
ners were' located as plaintiffs sought to show, then they were not
located as defendants contended, and vice versa. Incidentally, there-
fore, the issues in the form submitted imposed upon the defendants, as
a condition upon which they might obtain a favorable verdict, the
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the corners
were not as contended by the plaintiffs. Let us suppose the jury had
found the evidence of equal weight supporting the contentions of the
plaintiffs and the defendants. How would they have answered the
issues so that the verdict would have been based upon a preponderance
of the evidence? It is clear that no such answers could be made." 5
After saying that the defendants' evidence tending to establish a
different location was in rebuttal to plaintiffs' evidence, he con-
cluded:
... it has been repeatedly held upon similar situations that where the
evidence tends to establish a fact or facts constituting a complete de-
fense, the defendant in a case submitted on special issues has the right
to have submitted an issue or issues calling for a finding of such fact
or facts. Such issues are required to be so stated as to place the burden
of proof upon the plaintiffs to establish the negative.'"
... 41A Tex. Jur. Trespass to Try Title §§ 26-27,33,35-36 (1953).





In Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Owings.' the court held
that the defendant was entitled to have submitted an issue on the
location of the line, as he contended it was located, even though the
line would be situated differently from where plaintiff sought to
locate it. The court said that an " . . . answer of an issue favorable
to plaintiff will not obviate the necessity of requiring an answer to
the issue pertaining to defendant's rights .... This is true even if the
answers to the defensive issues result in contradiction to those for
plaintiff. 148
It concluded that the burden was on plaintiff to show that the line
was not located where defendant contended it was located and that
the burden had been improperly placed on the defendant.
A similar decision was rendered in Snyder v. Magnolia Petroleum
Company. "' The court compared the defensive issue of a different
location for the line to the defensive issue of unavoidable accident.
Judge Speer in the Owings case, in holding that the defendant was
entitled to have submitted a special issue inquiring whether the line
was located as he claimed it was, with the burden on the plaintiff to
prove the negative, cited Wright v. Traders Lf General Insurance
Company,"' a workman's compensation suit. The court in that case
held, in effect, that if the defensive issue is merely the opposite of
the plaintiff's issue, it need not be submitted, but that if the defen-
sive issue is the converse of an issue submitted for the plaintiff, it
must be submitted at the defendant's request."' However, the ob-
scure distinction between converse issues and opposite issues, as they
may relate to boundary suits, has not been discussed in the opinions.
The burden is quite heavy on the plaintiff when he must show
where the line is and is not located. The Owings case never reached
the Supreme Court, and writs were dismissed in the Jones-O'Brien
and Snyder cases. No case has been found where the Supreme Court
has followed the rule announced in'these three cases.
The authorities are not harmonious as to whether the court should
give an instruction to the jury on the priority of the calls in the
field notes. In the Owings case the court instructed the jury that if
there was a conflict in a call between its course, distance, or natural
or artificial object, the jury must give controlling effect to natural
objects, artificial objects, course, and distance in the order named.
147 128 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
I'sId. at 73.
149 107 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
150 132 Tex. 172, 123 S.W.2d 314 (1939).
11 See Stone v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 21, 273 S.W.2d 59 (1954).
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On appeal it was held the instruction was not a general charge, the
court saying:
The court included that paragraph in his charge, evidently upon the
theory that it was explanatory and necessary to enable the jury to pass
upon and render a verdict upon the issues submitted. Article 2189,
R.C.S. provides, among other things, that: 'In submitting special issues
the court shall submit such explanations and definitions of legal terms
as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and
render a verdict on such issues.' Strictly speaking, the charge com-
plained of does not explain or give a definition of any legal term used
in the charge. But we believe the purpose of the statute was to facili-
tate and aid the jury in understanding the issues submitted, so as to en-
able them to answer the questions intelligently. 5 '
A different conclusion was reached in Swearingen v. Brown."' The
court there held that a charge on the comparative dignity of calls
was on the weight of the testimony and would have been more con-
fusing than helpful.
The issues should be framed so that it will not be necessary to give
an instruction on the comparative dignity of calls. The rule of com-
parative dignity is a rule of evidence, but it will not be arbitrarily
applied to bring about a result obviously at variance with the inten-
tion of the original surveyor.'
The case of State v. Franco-American Securities"'. was a hard-
fought, well-tried boundary suit. Fifteen special issues were sub-
mitted to the jury and may be found in the opinion. Various issues
were submitted on the location of lines, identification of objects, and
whether calls for adjoinders were inserted in the field notes through
mistake. The land lawyer will profit by studying the issues." '
Too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the importance of
monumenting and identifying with certainty the line which a party
contends coincides with the original marked line and the original
monuments which have disappeared with the passage of time. The
5 128 S.W.2d 67, 75-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
33 195 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e.
54 Garcia v. Garza, 161 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); see also Lemm v. Miller,
245 S.W. 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 276 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1925); W. T. Carter & Bro. v. Collins, 192 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error
ref.
155 172 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.
... Other issues may be found in Wyman v. Harris, 222 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) error ref. n.r.e.; Davis v. Woolverton, 184 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. w.o.m.; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Owings, 128 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939); Snyder v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 107 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error
dism.; Cockrell v. Work, 94 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism.; Mid-Kansas
Oil & Gas Co. v. Burton, 87 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error granted and dism.
by agreement; Redden v. Pure Oil Co., 86 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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issue submitted to the jury must identify a line on the ground so
that a proper judgment can be rendered on the verdict. The issue
will not be as difficult to submit if the inquiry is directed to objects
upon the ground.
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